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I  shall  d.evote this  last  speech of  thg  Institute  to  trying  ,':.;i.
';t"t
to  point  out  sone of  the  main common  features  of  the  1egal  pattern  ,4
of  the  three  European Conmunities.  I  am perfectly  aware that,  by  .'tlji
d"oing so,  I  wilt  not  ac1d.  anything  to  the  extensive  knowled.ge  of  the  ,'.::
European Communlties that  the  f oregoing  speeoh  es have given  /our 
::::
Right  from  the  start,  Prof.  Eric  STEItf n.ur, by his  comprehensive  -ti.
..  . r :.t:
talk  and.  by  his  precise  answersr made  you faniliar  with  the  legal  '.ii-:
.:r1;:
structure  of  the  European Community. My ain  will  be .to subnit  to 
:,'.-;1
you a few remarks as  to  the  special  1egal  conf:itions  under which  ;",'tii - 
"l
European integration  is  d.eveloping and.  as  to  'b.he  legal  methods  :i:.
..1'.:
adopted.  by  the  six  countries  to  achieve  this  integration.  ,t,-
:'ii.
If  I  appear to. be very  systematic  in  d.oing so,  I  would.  ii
'  . ..'!::::.
ask you to  excuse mer not  only  on the  ground.s that  I  am a Frenchman,  ,,.i,
': .  r.:
but  on accoqnt  of  the  very  task  that  the  program of  this  Institute  ,'..,;;
.  . 
:  .:::i:
has  laid  upon my shoulders .  r.,r'!
:-.= ,,  :.1::. ' 
'  'li:
Thewho1e1ega1$ystemoftheEuropeanCommunityisbased.￿
.:!
on  the  agreement  of  the  Member  States  to  submit  to  oommon  rules  anal  .,1.:i
to  transfer  part  of  their  polvers to  common  rnstitutions.  , ,,  ,,
,.  i ,,,.
,'i
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                                                     1AMERICAN FEDERATIOIiI AND EUR0PEAN COlitI,iIINITy
Such  an  agreement
of  the  United. States.  But
the  U.S.  fecleral-  system in
be nislead.ing.
must  seem very  familiar  to  the  lawyers
to  look  for  a  close  transposii;ion  of
the  legal  system  of  the  Comrnunity would
The sociologlcal  context  of  the American Federatlon  and
that  of  the  European 0ommunity are entirely  d.ifferent.  Even when
recalllng  the  early  period  of  the  Amerj-can  union,  fund.amental
differences  appear,  3y  and.  Iarge,  one language,  one  faith,  one
sovereign  and one larv created. such unity  that,  had.nft they  found
in  the  Britlsh  Crown one ennemy  the  Thirteen  Colonies  might  have
become  a British  Domj.nion. 0n the  contrary,  the  European Community
assenbles tod.ay  six  separate nations,  where four  d.iff erent
languages are  offlcially  used and.  six  d.ifferent  States  are  fully
cleveloped. Moreover, histbry,  that  has mad.e  the.  American states
more and.  more united. during  the  past  two centuries,  has made  the
mehber countries  of  the  European Cornmunity  more and more d.ivided
up to  the  last  fifteen  .rears. lt/ithin  these countries,  cl.ifferent
problem.s  have arisen  and had to  be d.ealt with;  dlfferent  policies
have been led. which have resulted. in  d.ifferent  structures,  both
economic  and.  politica].  Even the  industrial  rr)volution,  though
affecting  the  six  countrles,  has not  clrawn  th,:m  nearer  since  it
/
has developed in  separate markets and mad"e  those countries  fier.ce
competitors  when  not  enemies.
This  situation  has far-reachi-ng. consequences  for  the
lega1  systems of  the  European Community. To an European lawyer  two
of  them are  peculiarly  striking  in  comparisoir vrith  the  1ega1
system of  U.S'  The European Community  has not  fourrd.  the  support  of
unity  of  1aw  vrithin  the rnember  countries;  neither  has it  been able
to  achieve,  as yet  anyhow, a federal  State.
,/,.
                                                   
                                                    21)Ind"eed",theexistenceof''g@liintheU.S'd.oes
not  mean that  a  single  law  is  apnlied- throughout  the  nation.  :
Ft"tutory  lavr hag,become  more and more important  in  each State.
In  the  field.  of  "common  lavrrr  itself  ,  the  Erie  Railroad. cl.ecis.ion
seems  to  have rejected. since  l-g1,B  the  long  discussed.  tl-e,rrl  of  a
I'fed.eral  gener:al common  Iaw",  through  which  Justice  Story  hail
perhaps dreamt that  'rcommon  lawtt may be  some  d-ay  unifieCl  in  the
U,S. But  it  seems  fait  to  assume  that  the  adoption  of  ficommon  lawrl
by  all  the  Amerlcan States  (yitl  the  famous exception  of  Louj-siana
for  which  I  feel  as a Frenchman  partly  responsible)  has promoted
throughout  the  vrhole nation  the  reference  to  the  same  basio  1egal
principles,  the  use  of  the  sane 1ega1 methocLs;  ancl a continuous
comparison of  the  law in  the different  States,  greatly  helped in
the  last  years  by  the  Restatement of  the  Lavr  and the  State
Annotations.
No such support  is  ava1lab1e for  tl e legal  systen  of  the
European Comrnunity.  The pr^sent  Mernber  States  have much 1n commont
it  is  true.  The six  illember  States  are  countries  of  "Civil  Lawr';
their  Codes, mostly  icl.entical at  the  time  of  Napoleonr are  stlll
much  alihe  in  some  field.s.  But  their  separate evolution  during  a
century  and-  a half  cf  higirly  important  political  and economic
events has led. to  inportant  modifications  of  the Napoleon Codes  1n
most countri-os,  and-  to  the  replacernent of  the:se  Codes  by new oneg 1n
Germany  arrrl Iteily.  Legal principles  are  stil.l  basi"cally  the  samet
but  legal  textg  d,j.ffer,  dnrl not  only  on account  of  the  langua,gee.
Legal methods and.  procedures are  often  d.ifferent.
Matters  have been made  worse by  the  enormous increase  of
economic legislation  during  the  present  century.  Tlhereas  in.the
Ul.ited States  thls  legislation  is  mainly  federal  and therefore
singlel  each meirber country  of  the  European Comnunity has developecL
its  own economic conoeptions  and its  own legaL  :r",rIes  and.  publio
organizations.  Comparison  is  d.ifficult  therefore,  and even contacts
between 14s,yers of  the  slx  cotrntries  have been scarce  during  long
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As  a  result,  the  ad.option  and application  of  common
rul-es  ln  the  European  Community requires  preliminary  explanations
and  mutual  concesslons  which  have  been  .spared. to  the  American
Union  ever  since  it  was envisaged..
2)  The sociological  rea$ons  briefly  recalted  above have
also  prevented  the  Governments of  the  l/ienber States  from  setting
up  a  real-  feder+r.  state.  They  have  transferred-  powers  in  the
fleld-  of  econorny; they  have  not  glven  a\yay their  rights  of
sovereignty  as  regard-s for  instance  foreign  policy  (excepto-.for
conmercial  matters), armyr  policgrfinance, welfare, and  so or1.
The hard.  core  of  polltica]  povrer  rernains vestecl in  the  six
nations  and not  in  the  community, contrary  to  what happens in  a
federal  sta.te.  This  does not  prevent  to  make  use vrithin  the
Community  of  some  federal  techniques.  But  it  does prevent  to  make
use of  those federal  techniques which are based.  on the  exercise
of  the nationaL  sovereignty  by  the Federal state,  such as the
direct  enforcement of  decisions  by the  fecleral  authorities  or
the  recognition  of  a full  falth  ancl  credit  blause.
The legal  systenr of  the  European Communlty  is  therefore
found-ed  on the  fact  that  the L{ember  States,  renainlng  present}y
sovereign  in  the  politj.cal  field,  have transferred.  lirnited. povrers
in  the  field.  of  economy,  ln  ord.er to a.chleve strecified, objectj-ves
vrith  well  d.efined means  r
To start  uniting  these states,  where various  languages
aro used.r  different  lavrs applied  and national  sovereigntles  to  a
large  extent  untouched.,  original  methods  have been necessary.  It
wouldnrt  be fa.ir  to  judge  them by  comparison vrith  the  achj-evements
of  the  American Federation.  They must be understood  and.  appreciated.
in  relation  to  the  specific  problems and situation  of  Europe. fn
this  lightr  the  Iegal  innovations  aceepted already  by  the  six
.JrlR  / AO/  A6
                                                   
                                                
                                                   
                                                    4countries  may be  considered. as  the  first  steps  of  a  revolution-
ary  change  in  the  method.s of  internationar  partnership.
TI{E COMBINATION  OF COMI''iOIV  RULES  AND COMMO}I  INSTITUTIONii
The agreement of  the  Member  States  to  submlt  to  common
rules  withln  the  economic field  of  competence  of  the  Comr:runity
is  at  first  sight  the application  of  a classical  method.,  even if,
as ln  the  present  casee the  expressi-on  'rcommon  ruresrf is  not
applied- to  mere adninistrative  regul.ations  but  also  to  binding
provislons  in  matters  generally  d.ecid-ed.  upon by legislative  acts.
Almost clailyr. ind"epend.ent  States  commlt themselves to  reoiprocal
obligations  that  fall  under the usual  principles  of  international
lalv.  And-  in  the  econr:mic  field  such international  organizations
as G.A.T.T.  (General Agreement  on Tariffs  and Trad.e)  or 0,8;8.c.
(organization  for  European  Eoononic  cooperation)  have already
shown  the vast  possibilities  of  this  method..
,  But  thenr  whx should  the  l,{ember  sf,a1ss also  transfer
polrers to  cormon fnstltutions  ? Economy  is  nowad.ays  an essential
and'  wid'e field'  of  action  for  the Governments,  the most important
perhaps. Except in  unlons and feclerations  of  Statesr  a transfer  of
povrer  has never  been done before  on a broad. scale  in  t]hat matter.
Tilhy  does it  prove  necessary  for  the  Europeeun  Community  ? Because
in  joj.ning  the  uuropean community,  the  Menber states  have not
onry accepted to  submit to  common  economic  rules,  they have aLso
agreeil to  rule  jointly  their  economies, or  a very  signific=nt  part
of  it.  They have not  cleclded.  a mere cooperation;  they have
accepted integration,  vritir its  political  meaning. And thls  could
not  be done I'rithout transferring  porvers  to  common  Institutions
for  different  purposes.
l.i:
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common rules  must  be  applied.  and  enforced.  lonran
equal- basrs  throughout'the  Oommunity.  Horv  oould  the  rules  of
ral-r  competition  for  instance  be  lnterpreted  and. carried  on
sepa:iat'e'1y  by  the  national  Governments  wlthout  procluein.E  .,
diff  erences  that  lvould,  raj-se  susplcion,  aiscrimination  ".na
possibly  retorsion  ?
2)  rn  the  economic fierd  anyhow, the  transf.er  of  a mere
executive  povrer is  not  enough. The common  rules  can not  provid.e
in  detail  for  action  in  any economic  situation  likely  to  alrise.
A continuous  analysis  is  necessary,  appreciations  have to  be
mad'e,  aetion  must be clecided and.  carried.  on in  relation  with  the
circumstances.  In  this  action,  the views ofthe  national  govern-
ments are bound to  be different,  since  the balance of  lnterests
differs  from  one country  to  ancther.  A policy-rnaking  porver  nust
be transf,emed. to  politically  controlled.  common  Institutions.
Thls  policy-making  power is  all  the  more necessary  that
the  Community  shallr  &s such, assume  international  cormitments.
How 1n the  fleld  of  competence  of  the  Community  cou1d j-nternatlonai
obligations  be negotiated.  and.  become  bind.ing,  how courd  the
Community  as such be represented.  at  the non-member  States  or  in
the  j.nternational  organizat,ions,  unless  by  conmon  Institutions  ?
1)  The common  rures  can not  all  be set  up right  from
the  start.  NevI  economic situations  arise  .- experience has shown
that  the  economic situation  changes  between the negotiations  of
a Treaty'and  its  entry  into  foroe  i  nevr  problems appear as  the
provisions  of  the  Treaty  go into  application.  These provisions
nust  be colnFLeted.  and clarified,  as  experience  goes orrr A Treaty
amend.ment  can not  be negotiateiL  and adopted by  the  nationar
ParLiaments  each time.  A rwle-making  povrer  must be  transfe:nred.
to  the  conmon  Institutions  in  ord.er to  implement the  principles
and'  achieve  the  objectives  established  in  the  Treaties.
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4)  I\{oreover,  the  rures  of  the  Treat.ies  can not  even be  '.','=
setuponcefora1I.Experriencemayca11noton1yforimp1ement-￿
ation  brrt  for  acljustment  of  the  Tt'eaties.  The  rule-making  power '-  -ll9::  f-  :  --  -  - 
':'tt"-:t4
of  the  common  instltutions  will  then  become rea,rry  a  reviewing  .=
n*++  vrtsll  usvvllls  rEqt.LJ  (a:fitVlr':wflf6 
:,..-
power, which must of  course be expressly  provided  J'or ir'  the  .'=
Treatyl  and,loes  not  apply  to  those  provisions  ttrat  are  regard.ecl  .
'  ::i:liL'::l
as  fund.amental  and  can  only  be  mod.ified.  through  a  new Treaty  .,,.
l.;;
aking  and 
t,,
reviewjng  polvers  have  been  granted.  wlthin  the  European  Communlty  ,. ,,,,1
'.:l::i!,'
::il::'.t;j to  the  common  lnstitutions  vrhich Prof .  Erio  STEIN  ,has,  clesoribed  ,  r.;:'1rii
'.::. 
i
I  -: 1.  ;:i;
The cornbination  of  colnmon  rules  and of  cotnnon  insti'tutiorr,  .'tjji
applled  to  broad. .basic  economic  fleldi;  is  the  qrigin.ality  of  the  ,',  ,
: ,"  t,.1.jf'.i..i,
lega1 system of  the  European  Community.  It  is  the  1ega1  means  of  ''r.,
lntegration,  as  opposed.  onths  one hand.  to  inere trade  agreements
':l'tt::+
between sovereign  nationg  that  are  not  prepared. to  go further  1,,,,,8
:.'j;:::
tlran d"iplomatic  compromise -  or  lack.of  compromise  -r.and.  on the  ',,;:;.,,1;
other  hand to  a Fed.eral Constitution.  ','t:;,-=
Lrlrllf  orlo  ::'''i:i'i::'" ...:,.,:i::::a
'  j:r  '::j'':ii:::
.j
'- ::  :=.
j,:'l;
':
This  combination  of  comnon  rules  ancl conmon  institutions
,:  ,., raises  problems akin  to  f ecleralism as regards, balance  of  powers  ,..,,:,i,j:;
betvreen the  Member  States  and.  the  oonmon  Institutions.  They may be  '.
solvecl ln  different  ways as  the  experiencer.of  the  European
;r'l:j:::
Conmunity has.  alread.y shown  .  ,,,,'#
E
The Coal and Steel  Community  has been negotiated. in  L95Ot  -  '
f ive  yea"s  af ter  the  end.  of  V/orld. War f I.  .Mutuatr f ear  and. suopicion  ,''.:'-:i;
wer!  stiIl  very  fresh  in  the  peoplrest  minds.  0n the  other.hand.,  -...1i
each rluropean  country  was seeking  ecoriomic recoverJ:  through
,.,,t .,..=
#
d'ifferent  nethod.s, some  suppogod.  to  be very  liheral  and .some  less. ] -li
National  gover,nments ivere all  jnsIined.  to  be cautious  in  surrend.ing 
'
their  so-vereign powers to  common.  Institutions  in  which  sat  their  .,',..,;:
:,..-,:
€x renemies  and. the  policy  of  lrhich  could  not  be  foreseen.  ;i',:
.::.:
:t
                                                   
                                                
                                                   
                                                    7For  these  reasons,  the  European  Coa1,  and. Steel  Community
Trea.ty,  provid.es  for  :
1)  .  Iimited.  field  of  jurisd.iction,  which  'even
regard-s  coal  ancl steel  leaves  out  important  matters  sut:h
or  commercial  policy,  and
wages
2)  for  detalled  mles  and guaranteesz rvhich reduce the  .  .
scope of  policy-makinge  rule-making  and revierving  powers transferrecl
to  the  conmon  Institutions.  Und-er  those timitations,  the Mernber-
States  have agreecl to  vest  alrnost al-I  the  transferyed.  powers
directly  in  an independ"ent  borLy, the  HiSh Authority,  vrhich appears
as a strong  eommon  executive.  But most of  policy-maklng  and.  rule-
making d,ecisions  of  the  Higir Authority  require  the  previous
consultation  and 1n the  important  issues  the  previous  consent, 
:
sonetimes unani-mous  -  of  the  council  of  i{inisters.
The combination  of  ruLes  and.  povrers is  d.ifferent  in  tfre
Rome  Treaty  establishlng  in  J-g57  the  European Economic Community.
Mutuel  conficlence  had grown.. 'Ihg  expertencerof  the  Coa]  and Steel
Community  had shown  both  that  a common  policy  was possible  and useful,
antl that  economic  integratlon  could. only  be  caruied  on successfully
if  appliecl  to  the  whole  econony. This  meant that  the  4luarantees of
the Idember  States  should reside  less  in  rules  impossible  to  lay  down
in  the  Treaty  than  1n the  instltutional  pattr;rn  of  the  Comnunity.
Therefore,  1n the E.E.c.  Treaty,  a vast  flerrl  of  jurisdiction
includes  almost  the  whole economy  of  the  Mern'ber-Stateg;  very  broacl
pol.icy-making  powers are  transferred  in  such matters  as  commercial
po1icy,agricu1tura1po1icy,transportationpo1icy;thecomr￿non
institutions  &re entitlecl  to  establ-ish common  rules  in  ord.er to
lmplement most of  the  provisions  of  the Treaty;  they  can occasional-
Iy  make  decisionb  completing  and.  in  a limlted  scope modifying  the
Treaty.
as
as
ruB/  60/  60 ,/.  '
                                                   
                                                
                                                   
                                                    8The relative  lack  of  rules  in  the  Treaty  and  the  o-rOad
transf erre<l power'r  cal.l  f or  action  by strong  political  institutions  r
As long  as no real  federai  government  has been set  up,  the  political
responsibility  Iies  mainJy with  the national  governments. {}rere-
forer  while  the  executive  powers are  transferreil  to  the  Cornmission,
the  main policy-making,  rule-making  and reviewing  povyers  are
vested. in  the  Council  of  Ministers  in  which  sit  members  of  the
Governments. But  the  common  interest  is  always taken  into  consj.d-er-
ation.  The ind.epend"ent  Commission  has the  initlative  and parti-
cipates  in  the  making of  all  important  d.ecisions  i  the  Parliarnentary
Assembly participates  in  the making of  all  important  regulations
or  d.irectives  to  be set  up by  the  common  fnstitutions;  and the
Council  of  illinisters  is  or  will  be entitled.  to  make  most of  its
decisions  under  a majority  rule  in  oriler  to  avoid  veto  by  a Member.-
State  against  what is  consid.ered  by  the Commission  and.  the majority
to  be  the  interest  of  the  Comrnunlty.
When  oompraring  hovr  the  powers are  vested. in  the  common
j.nstitutions,  one might  think  that  the  1ega1 system of  the
European Coal  and Steel  Communlty, where decisions  are  mad.e  by  the
'High Authority,  is  nearer  to  a fed.eral system than that  of  the
European l4conomic  Community, where clecisions  are  made  by  the
Council.  But when consid"ering the  extent  of  the  field  of  juris-
dlction  and of  the  pov/ers  transferred  to  the  (,ommon  lnstitutions,
the  opposite  j-s true.  This  confj-rms that  only  an analysis  of  the
conblnation  of  conlmon  rules  and of  the  transferred  powers of  the
common  institutions  can give  a  fair  understand.ing of  the  European
Comrnunity.
trn the  light  of  this  cornbinat'ion of  rules  and powers,
the  recent  d"evelopments  of  the  European Community  through  the
Rome  Treaties  are  deoidedly  a big  step  forward  towa.rd.s  unlty,
wid.ening'the  field.'in  whi-eh  cdmmo'n.  rufes  are  appliect. and
transferring  stronger  povrers to  the  eommon  institutions.e
                                                   
                                                
                                                   
                                                    
                                                    9These rernarks explain  the  peculj-ar  drafting  of  tn"  .,
Treaties.  It  has heen alread.y noticed. by Prof.  stein. that  your  i
fed.eral Constitution  establishes  the  fed.eral institutior:s,  d.efines
their  tnutual  relationship  and their  jurisdiction  rvith  rcipect'  to
the  '5tates,  provid-es legal  protection  for  States  and lndividuaIs,
but  d.oes  not  set  up rules  for  substantive  p.olicies,  vrhich arje 1aid.
down in  federal  statutes.i  'It  has aLso been noticed. by Mr. Verloren
van Thernaat  that  the  rules  of  competition  of  the  Colnmon  hlarket
might  be  easler  to  i.nterpret  'and apply  if  they  had been stated.
in  three  basic  articles,  insteail, of  sixty  which have to,!,?p.onbin'ed.'
It  rnust.  be  rernernbered  that  the  national  governments,  rcrnaining  .
poritically  responsible  to  their  peoplel  have sogght to  Limit  the  :
polrers  transferred.  to  the  common  fnstitutions.
They have d"one  it  with  a remarkable  flexibillty..  For  \
each natter  concerned, the  Treaties  define  the  field  of  oompetence
of  the  Comnrunity, limit  the  scope of  transferred  powers and provid.e
for  a  proced.ure.  Thus the  nationaL  governnents,  vrhi.th would. have
not  accepted. an unlj-mited. trensfer  of  po\irers  in  economic matters  as
a whole,  have gone as f,ar as  they  could  in  each matter  towards
comnon  rirLes and.  common  povrers.'Ilore  flexlbility  stil1  has been
reached.  by  the  voting  rules,  a unanimous consent  of  the  Council
of  Ministers  d.uring  the  first  years  being  often  automaticallyr
replaeed.by  a merjority vote  later  on.  fhis  flexlbl11ty,  the  resul b
of  a pragmatic  approachr  is  certalnly  one of  the  main features
of  the  lega1  systen  of  the  lluropean Com,runity. rt  may perhaps have
other  apprications  in  ca.sea  where a  transition  from  national
sdvereignty  tovrard.s  integration  proves necessary.
It  does lead. though
institutional  maehinery.  Nelv
pattern  of  conimpn  goverhrnent .
from  the  nationg,l  governments
to  a  rather  conplicaied:  an&F.we€ik'"-"'it'-;r':!1':".
steps  towards.a,simpLr.lr  and stronger
require  & shif,t  of  political  power .
towarcls  the  common'  ins ti  tuti  o-ns_1.,**r*,...**,*r-
iP''rg"os''s:\'r**3t*'''
                                                   
                                                
                                                   
                                                    
                                                   10-II-
In  this  light,  the  d.ireet  election  of  the  European Parliarnentary
Assernbly  by  the  peoples  of  the  community rnight be an issne  of
great  significance.  Suoh an Assernbly, elected  on a  SqrLrf'€Dli
political  platform  to  get homc  &  European  policyr  may  have
enough  lveight to  be\alLocated. more powers, both  for  controtling
the  Executlve  bod"ies and in  the  law-making process.  The po.Iiticaf
reBponsibility  in  [uropean  matters  vrould.  no more 1le  eventually
with  the  national  governments only!
vilith this  view  in  mind., 1t  shourd.  be remind,ed.  that  the
Treaties  have provid.ed. that  the  Parliamsr tary  Assemblyr  oGtua1ly
composecl  of  members  of  the national  Parlianents,  will  roake  proposals
for  its  own  d.j.rect election  by  the peoples.of  the  0ommunity. A  '  i
special  working  group has been created. within  the  Asseurbly,
six  nonths or  so'ago.  Led by a Belgian  senator,  M. Dehousse,
this  commlttee has been  going  around.  the  six  capitals  and"  meeting
in  each Member  State  the  official  circles  and the  political  parties,
with  a view  to  draft  an agreement which  could  be  first  ad.opted  by
the  Assembly as a rvhole, and.  then  subrnitted  ag a proposal- of  this
Assembly to  the  six  lVlember  States.  The final  word.  indeed. will  be
up  to  the  si.x governments and even to  the  six  parllaments,  who
must approve the  agreemeht  proposed.  by  the Ass;mb1y. Most probably,
cluring  a  transitional  period.l  a part  of  the  nembers of  the
European Ass'bmb1y  vrill  remain members  chosen by  ancl  among  the
national  parliaments,  the  other  part  being  d.irectly  elected  by 
'
the  peopl"es. rt  ls  ve"y  lmportant,  in  ord.er to  make sure  that
this  European Assembly has polltical  strength,  that  Leaders of
the  different  political  parties  in'each  country  sit  in  the
Assemblyl  and these  leaders  might  hesitate  to  abandon their
traditional  and rvell  knovrn  work in  the: nrrtional  parliaments,  to
run  for  thelEuropean electione  and.  sit:exclusively  in  the Uuropean
Assemb1y.ThetranSitiona1period',as.we11agthecompatj.bi1ity
betwoen:  ttre,riati:ona.l aiid the  European reprbsenta,tionrrwitrL,:help.;  ,,. 
,,
tlre fornatign:'of  a iitrong,politi,oal"Surop'ean Assenrbly.  ,It  tralf:i,e..
hOped  that  the,,lsu,emb1y,,w,i.ll.bq,:abile  to. dis'cuss the,,,report of .the;
r.l.'.'.
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a' proposal  night  be  mad.e  to  the  Governments  before  the  end  of
thiF  year.  .
ENSURING  EXECUTION  OF THE COIVI,IUNITY  tAW
whatever  combinati.on of  rules  ancl povrers is  adopted.,
the  result  is  that  common  binding  ruies  are established,  whether
by  the  Treaty  itself  or  by acts  of  the  eommon  instltutions.  As
has previously  been explained.,  tbeee rnal be self-€xecuting
regulations  or  d-ecisionsi  or  also  ciirectives  rvhich bind  the 
,
Member-States to  which  they  are  ad.dressed  as  to  the  result  to  be
achievecl, while  leaving  to  national  Governments  or  agencies
a  competenca  as  to  forms and.  rfleans  to  be u.sed. The conmon  rules,
as  a vrhole, form  the  Communj.ty  1avi. Through which  systerns ig
execution  of  the  Community  law  ensured.  withln  the  community ?
1)  Execution  by Memb_e,r  States  relies  on a few principles  1aid.
d.ovrn  in  the  Treaties.
The main one ls  tle  d.uty for  each Member  state  to  take
all  general  or  partlcular  measures whiclr are  a,ppropriate  for
ensuring  the  carrying  out  of  the  obllgations  arising  out  of
the  Treaty  or  resulting:  from the  acts  of  the  common  institu[ons.
This  is  the basis  of  the rvhole legal  systeme arrd.'a  lr{emher  State
oourd not  fail  to  fulfil  this.fundamental  duty rvithout
questioning  the  very  existenoe  of  the  Comrnunity.
3ut,  each Member.  state  cannot be tlte  final  judge,of  its  .
own obl.igatigns  under  the  COmmunity  law.  A speeial  sys-teq1,,has  '
been set  up by  the  Treaty  to  settre  disputes  on this  matter,
and ttre Member fjtal .rs have undertaken  not  to  submit  a  aisprrie  , ,'
concern-|ng the ,inlerptetation  or  appli  -ca,f,ion  of  the  Treaty  to  ...
any methgd.  of  settrement  other  than  those  provid.ed.  for  in  the
..rrjetr; 
Ttiis pr:ovision niec,ruaas  Tne trJlenber  states  rrour,,@
                                                   
                                                
                                                   
                                                    
                                                   
                                                   12before  the  Inte-rnationar  Court  of  Justice  in  Thc Hague. under
the  Treaty,  the  court  of  Justice  of  the  community i-s j.rrileed.
competent,  and rules  supreme as far  as such disputes  are  concerned.
The Commission  and each,'ember State  can refer  to  the Court of
the  Communlty any  alleged  infringement  of  the  obligations  under
Community  law by a Member  State.
Tt  shalt  be observedl that  when a lVlember  State  intend.s
to  ifistitute  proceed.ings before  the  Court  of  the  Community against
another,  the  matter  must first  be referreci  to  the  Comrnlseion  which
must give  a  reasoned.  opinion  rvithin  a period  of  three  months.  Thus,
a d.ispute between &lernber  States  may be  settled.  by  the  Connission
without  it  being necessary to  refer  to  the  Court.  And if  it  does
go to  the  Court,  the  viervs of  the  Commission, speaking  for  the
common  interest  of  the  Community, will  be  talcen into  account  as
rvel-l-  as the views  of  the Member  States  involved  in  the dispute.
ilp  to  nowr no Menber State  has eve? instituted  such proceeilihgg.
It  sha1l  olso  be observed.  that  when the  Commission
consi-d,ers  that  a S{ember  State  has faiied.  to  fulfil  one of  its
obligations,  it  dust  f irst  ad.d.ress  a reasoned opinion  to. this
Member  State  and Iay  down  a reasonable period  to  comply with
the  terns  of  this  opinion.  This  procedure  of  a previous  reasoned
opinion,  given  after  requiring  the  Member  States  to  submlt  its
comments, has p.roved.  al.ready successful.  It  may be noticeit  that
und.er the  European Coal and.  Steel- Community  Treaty,  the  s&rlc result
is  achleved  by  a  somewhat  d.ifferent,  and less  friend.ly,  proceclure:
the  High  Authority,  af.ter  requiring  the  Member  btate  to  submit  its
comments,  states  in  a ilecision  that  this  Member  State  has failed
fulfil  one of  its  obligations  and.  lays  d.own  a. period. to  comply.
The Member  State  can then  attack  the  d,eclsion of  the  High  Authority
before  the  Court  of  the.Community.  This  procedure  has also  proved.
successful,  a4;  leelst  fo:r providing  the  Court  with  cases and the
lawyers  with  extra-work  !
                                                   
                                                
                                                   
                                                    
                                                   
                                                   13..If  the  Court  o.f Justice  f,ind.s that  a. Member State:has
indeed  failed.  to  fulfi1  any  of  its  obligations  under:  the  Community
IaI,r,  the  State  must  take  the  measures  required  for  implelreiriation
of  the: judgnent  of  the  Court.  If  the  Mernber  State  fails  to'take  ,
these  measures,  the  Community has  no  means to  enforce  the  Community
l-aw,  In  some cases,  retorsion  heasures  may be  trtJcen  by  the  common
institutionsr  or  rryith their  authbrization  by  the  other  Member
States,  to  correct  the  consequences of  the  failure.  This  provlsion,
sqmewhat theoreti  caL,  exists  in  the  European Goal  and Steetr Treaty,
but  has  not  been reproduced. in  the  Rome  ireaties.  In  reality,
failing  to  cornply  wlth  a decision  of  the Court sttr,tlng its
obligations  uncler the  Treaty  is  highly  improbable  on the  part  of
theiVIemberstateswh1chhavebeenand.aregenera11yconsciousof
their  1egal  obligatiorls  r  A failure  vrould then  mean that  a Member
State  is  questioning  the  Itaffectio  socletatisil  without  which the
Comrnunity  can not  liver  erC wouLd.  therefore  raise  a'basic  political
problem.  Ifhen drafting  the  Treaty,  the Member  States  have consiclerecl
that  such a situatlon  cruld  be handled between then on a polittcal
ancl  not  on a lega1 basis.
2)  ExeoFtign  of  the  Community  lavr by  pplsons  and enterprisgF  within
the  Community  do not  ralse  the  same problens.  :fhey must observe  i
i)  the  self-executing  provisions  of  the  Treaty;
ii)'tfre  provisions  of  the regulations  lssued.  by the  eommon
Institutions,  which  are  al1  binding  in  every  respect  &r.,+
directly  applicable  in  each Member  State  in  the  same  rvay
as a national  latv;
&s well  as
iii)  the declsions  addressed.  to  them. Tlhile the::egulations  are
published. in  the  Offlcial  Journal  of  the  Community, the
decisions  are notifi.ed. to  the  ad.dressees  antl take  effect
up.on  such notification.
                                                   
                                                
                                                   
                                                    
                                                   
                                                   
                                                   14If  intLivid.uaLs cr  enterp:rises  fail  to  conply  vrittr their
obligations  und.er the  Community  Iaw,  penalties  may be :nposetl
upon  them,  These penalties  shoulcl be  the  se.me  throughc.,,it i;h-b
Corrmunity  when the  same  infringements  are  committed.. But  penal
Iaw remains a matter.of  the  competence  of  the Mernber  States  and
is  applied.  in  each State  by  the  national  Courts.  No uniformity
can be  reached" through  penal  law.  The European Coal  and Steel
community Treaty  has therefore  enpoqered.  the  High  Autlrority  to
apply  pecuniary  sanctions  or  daily  penalty  payments within  limits
set  up in  the  Treaty.  The person  or  enterprise  concernecl  rnust be
previously  required.  to  eubmit  its  comments. The d.ecisions  inrposing
pena1tiesmaybereierred.tothegenera1jurisdictionofthe
Court,  thus  entitlecl  to  annul  the  d.ecision  or  mod.ify the  penalty.
special  penalties  have been provid.eil for,  as has been explained
by  I{r.  Vogelaar,  in  EURAT0M  Treaty.  The EUROPEAN  EC0NOMIC  COMIIIUNITY
Treatyd'oesnot1nst1tuteitse1fpena1ties,buttheywi11b".
provided. for,  whenever.necessary,  in  the  regulations  issued. by
the  common  institutions.
A special  systern of  enforcement  of  pecuniary  obligations
is  provided. for.  rt  v;il1  apply  to  enforcement of  the  above-
tnentioned.  penalties  I  but  also  to  enf  orcement of  the  d.ecisions  of
theCourt.Asa1readynot1cec1,theCommunityhasnomeanSofit,3
own for  enforcing,  such decisions.  The Treaties  have therefore  ,-.
stipulateil  that  forcecl  execution  sha1I be automatioally  ensured.  '',,'...
by  the Member  States.  The writ  of  execution  shall  be serve(t by
':
theMenberStateswithoritotlrerforna1itythantheverification￿￿￿
of  the  authenticity  of  the  decision  issued. by  the  colrunon  instituti-ons,...,
No previous  review  of  thls  d.ecision  can be mad.e  by  any authority
of  the  Member  Sta.tes.
?his  special  system.  which  has proved  suocessful  on
several  occasions  in  cr,,uI and.  steel  matters  is  typical  of  the
commrrnity. The common  institutr-ons  are  the  mind.l decid;Nng on
the  basis  of  comnon  interest,  The Mernber  states  are  the  a:rm,
bound to  give  fu}I  recognition  to  the  oomnon  ilecisions,  as  to
their  own  national  decisions..
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, :  The  blncli.ng  eff.egt  of  the ,..-
States  lanrt  upon  the  private  persons
jud"icial  control.  Two main  probl-ems
Comraunj.ty law  upon  Me-mb'ei
or  enterprises  call  for  a
arise  !
1) First,  the  rules  set  up,  i-n the'Tieaties  themselves have
been accepted.  by national  Governments  and.  Parliaments.  Their
ad.optiorr has followed.  the  same  proced.ures and offer  the  same
guarantees as national  lavr. This  is  not  the  case for  the rules
' lssuerl by  the  common  institutions,  These should be bind.ing  :
only  as far  as the  limitations  and,.guarantees  established, in
the  Treaties  have been observed.. Issued  by virtue  of  ,transf,erred
povlers, they can not  cxceed.  the  frontiers  or  ignore  the  cond.itlons
set  to th e  transfer  of  porvers.
Though the  d,efinition  of  these  lirnits  and cond.itions  is
a  iob  of  groat  political  signlficance,  the Member  States  have
agreed'thata11d'isputesarisingonthismattershou1d.be
reforrecl  to  the  Corrt  of  Justice  of  tl:e  Community, enpowered to
take  final  d.ecisions.  ft  shouLd.  be remind-ed,  that  the  members
of  the  Court  serve  fuII  time  and have to  leave  a.side any occupation
that  is  consid.erecl  by  the court  ltseIf  or  by  the  councir  of
Nlinisters  fls lnconpatible  with  their  activity  as judges of  the
EuropeanComrnun:lty.Theyareanyhowkeptbusybytlrisactiv1ty.
0n first  January r96a,  the  court  of  Justice  whichr  aF you kn,u,
is  a single  court  for  the  three  Communitiese  has been referred. to
for  1!0  cases,  out  of  vrhich r17 concerned the  coal  and steel
community, and {  only  concerning  the  Economic comrnunity. These
f,igures  ehould not  raise  cloubts as  to  the  legality  of  the  decisions
of  the  Hlgh  Authority.  Indeed.e  out  of  {8  d.eclslons which  haze been
given  by  the  Court  on Coal and Stee1 matters  on last  January  lst,
{O have been glvon  in  fruvor of  thc  High  Authority.  The reason  of
the  higher  number of'cases  regarding  the  CoaI and,  Steel  Comnunity
is  that  this  Community  is  in  operation  since  eight  ye&.rs, whereas
thc  two other  Comnrunities are  still  very  young.
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rt  must  be  stregse-cl ttrat  the'court  of 
'the',goamqnity 
.
d-oes  not  give  opitrions,  save  in  exceptional  ,occasj"ons rirlated.  to
international  agreements  to  be  conclud.ed  by  the  Communiii*",tto"
by  the  Member States  or  to  reviewing  of  the  Coal  and. Steel  T,reaty.
As a rule,  the  court,  samo  as the  u.s.  suprene court2  judges'the
cases pu,t before  lt.  Therefore,  the  eommon  institutions  musti ''
first  issue  their  rures.  But  any of  the  bind.ing acts  lssuecl by
the High Authority,  the  Commissions  or  the Councils  of  Ministers,
can be  suecl  before  the  Court  for  annulation  if  this  particular
act  is  thought  to  have beon taken  against  the  trrovisions  of  the
Treaties.  By annulring  the act  or  part  of  it,  or  by rejecting
the  clairn,  the  Court  clecides on the  linrits'  and cond,itions  of ,the
transferofpowersgranted.tothecommoninstitutions.The￿
rea,sonings of  the  Court  are  therefore  extrenely  significant  for
the  checks and balances  of  the  European community.
This  system can no!  be applied  if  the  oommon
have issued no acts.  rnaction  may  nevertheress  prove to
to  the  Treaties.  The comnron  rnstitutions  may therefore
to  act,  and tho  corrt  of  Justice  may  be referred. to  if
not  complied.  vrithin  a pcriod. of  two months.
institutions
be contrary
be requi.red.
they  have
0n account of  the  political  meanlng of  the deoisions
oftheCourt,c1ainrsagainstthe,actsissued.bythecomInon
institutions  canr &s a rule,  only  be raised. before  the  gourt  by,
the  lllember  States  or  the  common  Institutions.  Tl,/o  large  excentj.ons
are  provided' for.  0n the  one hand.r &11  individ"uaL  or  an entcrprise
can always sue before  the Court  a decision  of  a oommon  institution
addressed.  to  it,  clirectly  or  ind.irectly.  On the  other  hand.1  indi-
vid.uals  or  enterprises  can at  an),!  tiure  allege  the  inapplicability
of  a rcgulation  of  a conmon  institution  when this,  regulation  is
invokecl against  thqm in  legal  proceedings,a But  in  this]case,  the
regulationr'  if  found- coni rary  to  the  Treaty,  will  not  be declared.
nu1 and void.t it  will'only  be inappliqable  in  tho,casje oonoerri6d.,.'
l. :::::: - -
..'.:,:.t.'
;',,'.;.::":-,'
                                                   
                                                
                                                   
                                                    
                                                   
                                                   
                                                   17i:-.:
2)  The second.  specj  fic  problem of  judicial  control  arising  within
the .Commun.*ity  relates  to  unity  of  interpretation  of ,the,,0orirmunrty
lawi.:3eing bind-ing and,self-executlng,  the  rules  provitled.,fo:e  in
siorrs oi' the the  Treaty,  &s well  as in  the  regulatlons  and ,d.eci
common  institutions,  must be applied.  throughout  the  Community
by  the  national  Courts,  This  means that  each national  court  is
going  to  interpret  the  Community law  1n its  own w&Jfr  Even 1f
these  courts  are  bound.  themselves in  their  own State  by  the
clecisions  of  the  Nationa]  Supreme  Court t  at  least  six  interpret-
ations  of  the  Connunity  1aw mlght  co-exist  within  the  Community.
To avoid. such legal  insecurity,  as well  as  contradictory
jud.gmentswhichmight1ead'tonationa1d1scriminations,the
Treatles  have set  up the  following  principles,  sornewhat
d"ifferently  applied.  i.n tire  EUROPEAN  COAL  AND  STEEL  COMI,IU}IITY
Treaty  and.  in  the  ROME  Treaties.
When  a question  relating  to  interpretation  of  Community
Iaw,  or  to  the  validity  of  acts  issued.  by a comnon  institution,
is  raised  in  legal  proceed.ings  before  a national  Court,  the
Court  of  tlle  Community  is  competent to  pronounce upon thls
question  by a preliminary  d.ecision.  If  the national  0ourt
consld.ers that  its  judgments d.epend.  on the  answer to  this
question,  lt  may request  the  Court  of  the  Corr.nunlty  to  give  a
pnelininary  decision.  If  it  d.oes  not  make  this  request,  and.
that  the  question  of  interpretation  or  valid.ity  of  Cornmunity
1aw is  reaIly  essential  for  the  oase involved.  t  &yr  appeal  vrill
be brought  nost  probably  before  the  National  Supreme  Court.
And the  National  Supreme  Court  is  bound.  by  the  Treaties  to
request  a prellminary  clecisj-on from  the  Court  of  the  Community.
At  this.l.ast  stage of  judieial  c'ontrol  by national  Courts,  the
Court  of  the  Comnunity; must be  referred.  to  and g:ive the  final  :
d.ecision on the question  of  Community  law.
.---  t t^  J z^
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of  a  judicial  control  of  the  Community:  lavr shorvs  how the  absenee
of  a fecleral  State  weakens .t b e  legal  system of  thq  Community.
Vrlhere  are  the  Jud.iciary  Acts  organizlng  federal  jur:Lsdiciions
competent to  d.eat with  all  eases involving  federal  larv ? .Vfhere
is  the  procedure of  romoval,  entitling  the defendant or  the
Attorney  General  to  brJ-ng before  the  fe&eral  Courts  any matter
referred  to  a State  Court i4  y1|1ioh  fed.eral law is  belioved  to  be
involvect'? l,{ore  still,  where is  article  VI  paragraph 2 of  U,S.
constitution  ensuring before  all  Courts,  whethor national  or
fedcral,  the  absolute  suprernacy  of  federal  raw on tho  laws and
constitutions  of  the  States  ? No d,oubt  the  lawyer would.  wi1ling1y
accept  that  political  d.ecisions could. enable him to'forge  such
lega1 instruments.
But  no tloubt  cither  that  as yet  the  lawyer  is  grateful
for  the  considerable  steps  taken  by  sovereign  nations  tro pave the
way for  a coherent if  not  perfect  Iegal  system within  the  Community.
Far  d.ifferent  from n federal, state,  the  community  is  also  far.
beyond.  the  usual  mcthocts  of  inter:national  lavr. And how indeeil
cou}d'area1and.1asting.Europe.anunityd.eve1opbythesemethod's,i
without  any community lavr,  arnd  without  a  transfer  of  powers
entltling  common  institutions  to  implement or  make the  l.avr  ancl
ensure unlty  of  its  interpretation  ?
CO}m{UNITY.  LA14I  AND NATICNAL,  IAWS
The agreement of  the Member  States  to  make these  steps
should. not  be und"erstated.. It  is  all  the  more significant  that
it  implies  alread.y a .great  influence  of  Community  law  and common
institutions  on national  laws.  rn  the  f ierd  o.f pubLic  Iaw,  the
Member  States  are  bound to  change grad.ually  many of  the  national
rules  to  cor.rply  vrith  ihe  Community  law,  whether  it  be in  tariffs,
t. .-  .'::: .. .-:
:  -.r:...:.
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right  of  establishmentr'organization  of  the  agricultural  markets,
or  in  rules  of  c'rripctition,  health  and. safety,  etc.  But  the
impac.t.of0onaunityia:;.exttendsa1sotonationaIprivate.riw;￿
under  the  anti-trust  provisions  at  least,  some contracts,  valid.
up"to  then,  becone nu1  and void i  corpora.bion  law  is  or  wi,r1.'be
affected.  Even national  penal  law  is  modified.  through  the  provisions
of  Es3511om  Treaty  stipulating  that  a breach  of  the  secrecy  obligatlons
set  in  that  [reaty  is  subject,  as  regards  substance  and. jurisd.iction,
to  the  provision  of  the  Mernber  States,  municlpal  law  concerning  the
endangeringofitsovfnsecuri-tyoTconcerningthed.isc1osureof
professlonal  secrets.  r
The  influence  of  Community Iaw  on national  constitutional
law  of  the  Member states  is  particularly  striking.  Belgiurn  and.
tuxembourg  have  beon 1ed. to  mod.ify or  start  mod.ifying  their  consti-
tution  in  ord.er  to  comply  vrith  their  obligatlons  und.er the  Community
1aw.Fromnowon,IienberStatesrnaybeob1iged',withoutd'ecisionof
their  national  Parliarnents,  by  international  agreenents  conclud.ed.
bytheCornrrunity1nthefie1tLofcommerciaIpo1ioy.Nationa1
legistration  may be modified  by regulations  issued  by  the  conmon
institutions  vrithout  prevlous  decision  of  the  natlonal  parl-ianentsr
The ltalian  govcrnment  has  been  enpovrered.  for  a  timited.  periocl. to
tnake d'ecisions  ln  the  legislative  fleld  in  order  to  cornply vrith
the  obligations  of  the  Treaty.  The shift  of  power from  the  national
Parliaments  .to  the  common  institutions  is  so great  that,  whire
aocepting  ratification  of  the  Bonre  Treaty,  Germany hag  issued
speeial  rules  for  its  application.  The Gernan Parliament  has bound',
the  Government to  keep  it  informed  of  any  iregulatioiis'issu-:d  by
the  Councll  of  lUinisters  r  no  agreement  of  the  German  Government
in  the  Council  being  given  previous  to  thls  information  vrhen the
proposed. regulation  inrplies  a modification  of  the  German 1aw.
,  The  whole  reg.rr  "y-btgr"  of  the  six  countries  has  been
started.tomovebytheComrruni-ty.Nationa1Iawisorvli11be
slorvly  modified.  toward.^r  harmonization  with  the  ]aw  of  the  other
McmberSjtates.And'ineachMenberstateisandwi1I.beapp1ied,
besides national  lav,  a Community  law,  more ancl  more
inportant  as the action  of  the oonnon  institutions  wilr develop.
.,'  ,,. t,1 
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,  :j;
The  pecuiiar  regar  Bystem  of  the  communi-ty is  rather 
tl:
'unusual.  f t  works  through  international  law,  as  werr  as  with  ,.,r:
f ed"eral  techniques.  It  combines self -executi-ve  Commtinlty,  1aw;  .'ti
and.  action  of  the  Member States  to  fulflI  their  obligatiorrse  t:i
Scholars  have been discussing  warmly  its  legal  nature,  ever  since  -
the  Coal  a,nd Stee1  Comrnunity started..  , .,,,:i;,
Consiclered from  the  realistic  point  of  view  that.  1aw 
" 
.!!:
is  naale of  expertence  and not  of  theory,  these  acad,emie  d.isiutes  ,' 
"'ii;
are  not  so  irnportant  after  all.  V{hen  a young  ch1ld  grows,  the  ,,,:,',:",.t1!
whole  family  d.iscusses vrhether  it  i-s the  very  irnage of  his  father  ..."':
or  the  living  portrait  of  his  dear  mother.  And eaoh one is  ,'.ir:
probably  right  because  the  chilcl  d.oes  walk  Ilke  his  father  but  ,,i,: '-..i.,il
',:'  i,:iil., does  smile  like  his  mother;  and. each one is  probably  wrong beeause 
'
..:  .,::  ,.:
who can  te11  rvhat  the  grown-up  ts  going  to-be  like.  ? But  the ,"1.
',.i
child  doesnrt  care because he knorvs  that  his  job  is  not  to  be 
.'.:
^a:l--  a-^-l  l  -  t  r 
':,',.,::':a:
alike  but  to  1ive.  The iob of  the European  Comrnunity  is  to  live, 
'"i
and  the  C6yylpunity is  d.oing  it. .t'  ; -';:;ti:
.,ii ,'::,a:i
what is  important  is  that,  uniting  in  the comnrunity,  ,'*#..:￿
"  :1i:l'?
European countries  are  at  work  trying  to  solve. by nevr  legar 
',,,''
t:a^* method's their  anoient  and imltatlngl  wher: not  tragiarprobleins.  ,.,:;!,
:',t:;:.#
.:::i:a:iEi
European integration  is  a blg  step  towards  endur.ing 
,':# unity.  It  is  al-so a big  step  toward.s  new appll.cations  of  ttre rulb  1,.,.'
of  1aw  in  internotional  relationship.  It  need.ed.  legal  c-.:ativeness. 'i.,.,;,
There has been pLenty to meet the political  requirements. Thls  :',
'.:.:1
should  make us  confident  that  by  a joint'effort  lawyers  vrill  be 
',,ii,
ab16  to  meet  all  politioal  requlrements  aiming  at  a  peaceful  :$..:.'$$￿
soclety.  ,.:;  .
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                                                21What is  also  important  is  that  European integration
is  a  eonstantlv  moving  and improving  process.  The fleld  of  the
European  Comrnunity is  grad.ual-ly  viidening;  the  transferred  powers
are  getting  more important;  political  responsibrlj.ty  is  shifting
gradually  from  each national  government  to  the  cunnr.,n  i-nstitutions.
At  the  same tinre,  action  in  the  outor  rvorld  is  increasingiy
important;  Mr.  Rey has  to1d. you  about  that,  The  European
comnunity  has  to  be  a moving  process  because  it  is  starting  a
change,  And the  most  efficlent  change is  that  the  people  of
Europe  begj-n to  look  at  their  common  future  instaad  of  gazing
exclusively  at  their  national  past,
r  bclieve  this  to  be  very  liopeful  when we are  al1
facing  the  chalLanges of  the  50rs.  yfe  will  have to  face  them
togetherr  by  joint  action.  This  most succesful  fnstitute  has
been a-contributlon  toward.s such  action,  for  which  we feel  very
grateful.
:.:,ii,
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